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Research Topic
 This presentation is drawn from research done at IDA over the past 
four years. The result of that research is scheduled to be released 
soon as IDA Report R-8396, Acquisition Policy, Cost Growth, 
and Cancellations of Major Defense Acquisition Programs.
 The presentation is, in particular, concerned with two results from 
statistical analyses. From the standpoint of the present looking 
back, these are:
– The wave of changes in acquisition policy during the 1980s and 1990s 
is not associated with changes in quantity adjusted Program 
Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC).
– The Packard reforms of July 1969 are associated with a statistically 
significant and persistent reduction in PAUC growth.
 The question addressed is whether these two results are creditable 
in terms of what we know about changes over time in acquisition 
policy.
1
Errors in the Conventional Wisdom on the Effects 
of Acquisition Oversight on PAUC Growth
 There is a consensus among statistical studies done over about the 
past 25 years that changes in acquisition policy during the 1980s 
and 1990s are not associated with reductions in PAUC growth.
 On that basis, it seems to have become the conventional wisdom 
that OSD-level acquisition oversight is ineffectual, at least insofar as 
PAUC growth is concerned.
 The conventional wisdom is wrong in two respects:
– It ignores initiatives on contract type and relaxation of acquisition 
regulations undertaken during (about) 1986–1998 which do not stand 
out from the clutter because a relatively small number of programs were 
involved.
– The studies on which the consensus is based did not consider the 
effects of the 1969 Packard reforms, and it turns out that is where the 
action is.
2
Background – Total Package Procurement (TPP) 
Contracts
3
 The defining characteristic of a TPP acquisition is that fixed price 
production options are included in a contract for Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) awarded under competitive 
conditions.
 At the upper limit, TPP contracts included a fixed price for EMD, 
fixed prices for all production lots, and fixed prices for major parts of 
support (e.g., initial spares, depot maintenance).
 At the other extreme, a TPP contract would have a cost plus 
incentive fee provision for EMD, “not to exceed” prices for low rate 
initial production, and priced options for portions of support.
The OSD-Level Milestones under McNamara 




MS Bconditional MS M
 MS Bconditional: Authority to undertake the development efforts required to 
support preparation a TPP contract or Fixed Price (FP) development 
contract. 
 MS M: Authority to contract for EMD and production. Effectively, combined 
MS C and MS D authority.
Concept Formulation Contract Definition Development & Production
* The MS names are assigned here for convenience; they were not named in DoDD 3200.9.
The 1969 Packard Reforms on Milestones and Contract 
Types
 In July 1969, then Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard 
instituted a package of reforms that made fundamental changes to 
the McNamara process:
– Contracting for EMD and production in a single step was prohibited 
and the use of Fixed Price development contracts was discouraged.
– A robust technology development phase was added.
– Separate milestones were established for entry into EMD and into 
production.
– The milestone oversight process was formalized. The first versions of 
DoDD 5000.01 and DoDI 5000.02 were issued.
5
The OSD-Level Milestones Post Packard’s 1969 
Reforms (DoDI 5000.2, 1975)*
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 Component spending on 6.4 (Advanced Development) now required 
OSD approval (MS I), which was regarded as program initiation.
 The EMD and production decisions were separated.
~ 6 to 8 years
* DoDD 5000.1 (January 18, 1977) was the first to give the milestones numbers.
Effects of the 1969 Packard Reforms on PAUC 
Growth
 The statistical analyses indicate that:
– Average PAUC growth during the period FY 1970–FY 2009 
remained below that of the McNamara-Clifford period.
– Average PAUC growth was lower because of a statistically 
significant reduction in the proportion of very high PAUC growth 
programs.
– The significant reduction in the proportion of very high PAUC 
growth programs persisted.
 The historical puzzle: Why did the effects of the Packard 
reforms persist over a period of 40+ years?
7
Persistence of the Packard Reforms
 There were many changes in acquisition policy and process during 
the 1980s and 1990s.
BUT
 The 1969 Packard reforms remained in place through the end of the 
study period (FY 2009) and beyond.
– None of the elements of the Packard milestone definitions and the 
review process were eliminated or rendered ineffectual by other 
changes.
– Some policy initiatives that affected a small number of MDAPs during 
the period 1986–2000 rejected Packard’s contract policy and/or relaxed 
acquisition regulations. The results were not promising.
– Most elements of the 1969 Packard reforms were strengthened after 
1969.
 Proof: By inspection. Read the successive versions of DoDD 5000.1 
and DoDI 5000.2.
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General Features of the DoDD 3200.9 Process
 The first edition of DoDD 3200.9 (February 1964) provided for a 
single milestone. The July 1965 edition added a second 
milestone.
 Reviews were initiated by a Component request to proceed with 
a major system acquisition.
 Reviews were conducted under the direction of DDR&E; 
decisions at least nominally were made by SecDef on the 
recommendation of DDR&E.
 The Component was required to submit a Program Change 
Proposal (PCP) and a Technical Development Plan (TDP), 
which was replaced by a Development Concept Paper (DCP) in 
1968.
 OSD Comptroller enforced the requirement for milestone 
authority before a Component could proceed with a major 
acquisition.
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Criteria for Grant of MS Bconditional Authority* 
1. Primarily engineering rather than experimental effort is required, 
and technology required is sufficiently in hand.
2. The mission and performance envelopes are defined.
3. The best technical approach has been selected.
4. A thorough trade-off analysis has been made.
5. The cost effectiveness of the proposed item has been determined 
to be favorable in relationship to the cost effectiveness of 
competing items on a DoD-wide basis.
6. Cost and schedule estimates are to be creditable and acceptable.
*  DoDD 3200.9 (July 1, 1965), paragraph VI.C, p. 5
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Packard Reforms that Directly Touched Cost 
Growth 
 Prohibited the use of TPP and discouraged the use of FP 
development contracts.
 Emphasized realistic costing and full funding and established 
independent costing as part of the milestone review process.
 Abolished MS Dconditional ; added MS I (to enter a phase for the 
maturation of key technologies); and separated MS M into MS II 
and MS III.
 Established the DSARC. Retained the Development Concept 
Paper (DCP), renamed it the Decision Coordinating Paper. 
Documentation requirements tailored in.
 Eliminated PERT requirements; required Component Heads to 
annually update DCP and report on cost growth of each MDAP.
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